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Never Again: the mantra of historical memory and moral commitment after the 
twentieth century’s totalitarian disasters. But when is this transformed from memorialising 
abstraction into immediate personal - or professional - imperative? Does ‘Never Again’ 
represent, in politician-speak, ‘our values’; or is it our responsibility?  
 
 Timothy Snyder warns that saying, ‘it can’t happen here’ is the ‘first step toward 
disaster’ (p. 114). Several governments, and many more political movements, now display 
tendencies that have previously transformed sophisticated polities into totalitarian regimes. 
To resist recurrence, Snyder argues, requires recognising the conditions that enable such 
transformations: conditions that need to be articulated to be avoided, just as when ‘the 
Founding Fathers debated the American Constitution, they took instruction from the history 
…of ancient democracies’ (Snyder, p. 9). There are no political institutions without 
comparative history, and there is no realism without awareness that today’s pragmatic 
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accommodations can become tomorrow’s crimes. Yet although trials of Nazi war criminals 
clarified responsibilities beyond the justification of such accommodation, enforcement has 
been fraught and inconsistent. Recently, claims of economic irresponsibility – themselves 
often associated with rising authoritarian and populist politics – emphasise the lack of 
penalty against those with responsibility for financial crises.  For some, political and 
economic irresponsibility fully converge in the Trump presidency.  
 
 Sceptics may find this overblown. Yet perhaps historical comparison can – if itself 
exercised with responsibility - achieve greater realism than the sceptics themselves can 
offer. This is the case made by two recent works, from Timothy Snyder (On Tyranny) and 
Thomas Docherty (Complicity), which diagnose a danger of totalitarian transformation in our 
current politics, and call for responsibility against a severe risk of complicity. Each, though 
differently formulated, distils scholarship of long genesis into erudite essays, delivered at 
action thriller-pace (James Bond even appears in Complicity). Undertaking the depth of 
cultural-political analysis that current crises demand, Complicity and On Tyranny translate 
between research monograph and political essay, the urge to take responsibility driving 
through both.  
 
Complicity maintains Docherty’s long-running application of a literary and critical 
ethic to contemporary political and organisational culture. Snyder’s readers might recognise 
On Tyranny’s similar distillations of long-evolving scholarship, notably his recent seminal 
Holocaust study, Black Earth (2015).1 Docherty was writing before Trump’s electoral victory, 
but during his campaign (Docherty, p. 25), whilst Snyder responds directly to that victory 
with a handbook for practical opposition, targeting a popular audience. Each chapter 
3 
 
explores ‘lessons from the twentieth century, adapted to the circumstances of today’ 
(Snyder, p. 13). Trump demonstrates the potency of comparative history; yet his mix of 
prejudiced aggression with chaotic distraction challenges its precise application.  The 
comparisons made here are nevertheless specific and substantial; sceptics of Trump’s 
alleged totalitarianism should read Snyder closely, even if institutional resilience and 
political incompetence have thus far prevented the full-scale transformation that the 
President loudly desires.  Whilst both books are extremely timely, each has an extensive 
scholarly hinterland, distilled and applied to 2016, and 2017, and whatever comes next. If 
we take seriously the idea of scholarship being applied to the real world, they suggest, these 
are the stakes.  
 
There are few contemporary literary scholars whose output is as consistently, purely 
exciting to read as Docherty’s. His previous recent work has vigorously confronted the 
contemporary Higher Education environment; Complicity takes the issues of institutional 
culture and personal responsibility to a broader canvas, whilst never descending into 
generalisation. Whereas a previous reviewer suggested that Docherty’s writing relied too 
much on ‘higher punning’,2 in Complicity language and speech remain central, but the 
arguments for their political significance are sharply materialised. The book delivers an 
expansive vision, but one into which precisely targeted grenades are thrown; Docherty’s 
style is unashamedly scholarly, but seeks neither to flatter nor to intimidate his reader 
(evading, incidentally, two tactics of speech in tyrannical regimes).  
 
Docherty uses literary scenarios and characters (Bartleby, Bond, Cordelia, Shylock) as 
case studies, almost parables (illuminated by theorists with whom he has long engaged, 
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notably Arendt, Lyotard, and Agamben). Throughout these readings, Docherty develops his 
underlying view of literature’s function in the imagining of a different reality, prompted by 
its basic alterity; rather than this generating a concrete alternative reality to impose, 
however, it involves a permanent capacity to re-imagine, a capacity Docherty theorises as 
providing for both freedom and responsibility. Nevertheless, a ‘concrete’ issue remains at 
stake, because our institutional conditions, and the political systems that affect them, can 
allow this capacity greater or lesser material space to be realised. Complicity flourishes 
(Docherty argues, following Arendt) when linguistic and aesthetic systems of essentially 
reductive and identitarian nature displace this material - and political - realm. Complicity 
becomes both an exercise in movement from literary analysis to political essay, and a 
significant theorisation of the political function and ethical commitment of literary criticism 
in its own right. Some readers may find the breadth of ambition startling, but Docherty 
channels it through an almost lawyerly precision whilst building a radically accusatory 
argument. 
 
At first glance, Snyder’s is a more straightforward, less theoretically involved work; 
its scholarly basis is evident, but so too is its targeting of a broad audience. It’s pointed, 
concise, quite didactic in its structuring as a series of ‘lessons’ arising from Snyder’s body of 
twentieth-century scholarship, notably on Nazi Germany’s eastern campaigns and atrocities.  
It also deserves to read by a broad academic audience; not only does it apply to the whole 
academy as one of the institutions Snyder views as necessary to opposing the re-emergence 
of tyranny; it also has specific resonances for literary and cultural scholars, with regard to 
his location of the aesthetic and the linguistic as necessary drivers of, and tools for, political 
transformation.  
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Were it not that both books’ titles/premises assertively characterise the current time 
by a personal and professional risk of complicity with dangerous political transformations, 
the benefit of reading these works together, one rooted in history and the other in literary 
theory, would not be obvious. Yet behind the immediate thematic connection between 
‘tyranny’ and ‘complicity’ lies a more substantive philosophical connection between the two 
books, not immediately apparent from their style or structure.  
 
This connection lies in Snyder, like Docherty, detailing a serious evidence base for 
understanding the attraction of certain political visions as primarily aesthetic and linguistic, 
and not necessarily aligned to material reality. Like Docherty, Snyder suggests that the 
ethical (and ultimately, realist) response to this is to establish a different engagement with 
that reality - and issues of language, encounter between individuals, and representation, are 
key. Again, like Docherty, Snyder casts this as a serious institutional responsibility, now 
under significant threat. Docherty himself argues that ‘the literary is literary… to the extent 
that it is critical of any fundamentalism’ (p.118). This is not an argument for relativism, but 
for its opposite, historical specificity: literature, as simultaneously material and imaginary, 
personal and public, refuses our reduction of our own actions to any fundamental account 
of the world as it, and as we, must be. In literature, historical agency returns in the form of 
imagining a difference in reality.  
 
This work of imagining is a matter of comparison: Snyder deals in direct historical 
comparison; Docherty, in literary comparison, but still always towards historical 
commitment. Although both Docherty and Snyder refer to multiple historical examples, they 
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focus on twentieth-century totalitarian regimes, particularly Nazi Germany (Snyder often 
also references the USSR). As Ian Kershaw observed, ‘the riddle of how such... breathtaking 
brutality and destruction could arise in a modern, economically advanced, and culturally 
sophisticated country such as Germany (with its many similarities to our own society) 
prompts… the perennial anxiety: could it happen again?’3 As allegedly an especially unlikely 
political transformation, Nazi Germany’s emergence demands attention to the conditions 
that enabled it. Snyder – like Kershaw, a scholar of exactly this - argues that the United 
States requires comparative attention.  
 
The fashionable response to this cites Reducto Ad Hitlerum – the charge that 
reasonable political differences are being attacked by hysterical invocation of Nazism. 
Michael Gove made this charge – elegantly, but ignoring the substance of Snyder’s evidence 
- against On Tyranny in The Times.4 Moshik Temkin expanded on it to attack all historical 
comparison for political application in a New York Times editorial.5 Probably sometimes 
claiming Reducto Ad Hitlerum is justified; unfortunately, used against any comparative 
reference to Nazism, it becomes itself the lazy trope it accuses. It risks treating Nazism as 
more metaphorical than historical, rendering ‘Never Again’ not a commitment of 
responsibility, but a statement of faith. As Kershaw and Snyder’s work reminds us, Nazi 
Germany was a functioning state, not an abstract evil, and emerged partly from democratic 
structures. Historical comparison need not be hysterical rhetoric; it can even be the counter 
to it. 
 
As Snyder says, ‘to understand one moment is to see the possibility of […] another. 
History permits us to be responsible: not for everything, but for something’ (p. 125). 
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Docherty finds a variant on this attitude in Herman Melville’s character Bartleby, who 
declares ‘I would prefer not to’ (p. 9). Snyder calls us to be responsible for something; 
Docherty’s Bartleby, not to be complicit in just anything. 
 
Snyder asks us to 'avoid pronouncing the phrases everyone else does' (p.59) and 
Docherty notes, ‘complicity… is established through… a reduced lexicon’ (p.19). Like that 
ever-resonant critic of totalitarianism, Orwell, both Snyder and Docherty despise corrupted 
circular language, the ‘shamanistic incantation’ (Snyder, p.66) of MAGA. Here Snyder and 
Docherty could almost sound like some contemporary muscular liberals who like to claim 
the tradition of Orwell (or of more recent figures like Christopher Hitchens). However, their 
position is based not in a macho commonsense humanism, but in a respect for the Other 
historically achieved through institutional and political rules, governing particular times and 
spaces, rather than allegiance to unchanging laws of nature identified as governing the 
world as a whole.  
 
For Docherty, such allegiance finds popular expression in ‘authenticity’. Docherty 
finds that currently dominant versions of authenticity enable complicity with destructive 
political transformations – an argument that Docherty roots in such varied sources as 
Derrida, Lyotard, Arendt, and John Macmurray. He takes this perhaps counterintuitive 
philosophical stance – that responsibility is incompatible with authenticity as normally 
understood – and substantiates it in material and historical terms.  
 
The responsibility Eichmann (and Brasillach, whose case Docherty also explores) 
sought to evade depends on the subject’s lack of fully authentic identity, of ‘some rule or 
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law that made us do as we did’ (Docherty, p.4). ‘Following orders’, Eichmann reflected his 
‘authentic’ identification with the Führer; the flesh of victims became no more than the 
word, eliminating responsibility (‘skin in the game’, as Docherty calls it), in favour of an 
abstract but authentic account of his actions. In Black Earth, Snyder characterised this 
prioritisation of both orders and a vision of ‘order’ over material conditions as an essential 
precondition for genocide.  
 
To remove something jeopardising this order, Docherty argues, it must be rendered 
invisible, as in the ‘linguistic legerdemain’ (p.35) of contemporary organisational life, which, 
he audaciously argues, echoes Eichmann in distancing ‘the self from her or his actions’, 
removing them from ‘historical engagement’ (p.30) in favour of ‘accounting’: 
 
‘Sacking’ sounds harsh; ‘redundancy’ sounds insulting or worse. Instead, 
management decides on ‘restructuring’ the business in the interests of establishing  
…a means whereby the factual and material realities of stripping an individual of 
their livelihood can be rationalised away, and thus forgotten. … 
 
Such restructuring… is, of course, a million miles away from the reality of the 
camps; but... [in] the prioritisation of abstract structure over material reality… there 
is a clear evasion of responsibility and its replacement with abstract accountancy. 
(Docherty, p. 35)  
 
Snyder finds a similar accounting in political demands to accept ‘appearances as 
reality’ (p.37), an abstract aesthetic order underpinning the orders that require complicity. 
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Docherty argues that this is also embedded within authoritarian transformations of the law 
into a tool to undermine the rule of law: 
 
We have to be complicit with whatever it is that the government determines 
as good: but it is government, not the legitimately established law, that rules. We 
then have a legitimacy that has shrunk to a mere legality (Docherty, p. 13).  
 
This eliminates an important effect of the rule of law, ‘our mutual confidence’ 
(Docherty, p. 12), established by protection from arbitrary power – like that which 
prioritises an abstract, aesthetic or rhetorical, account over awkward reality. A subtler 
elimination of confidence operates in the sacking/restructuring example: If one cannot have 
a conversation with the decision-makers – now the faces of a comprehensive rationalism 
needing no discussion – one cannot have confidence in one’s own security. This is not, as I 
read it, because one expects a job without conditions, but rather because we need to 
discuss those conditions within a shared language, not be referred to an impersonal 
accounting system.  
 
Docherty’s opposition between ‘accounting’ and responsibility anchors his 
movements between destructive political transformations and conditions of contemporary 
organisational life. Accounting involves disregarding consideration of the effects of an 
action, in favour of assertions of purity of intention, measured by one’s authenticity to a 
given identity (ultimately, a numerical/managerial equation of one person to one ‘role’). 
Testing this against current political transformations, we should note that Trump refuses all 
responsibility in favour of giving an account - the simpler the better, preferably reducing to 
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number, as Docherty argues such accountability tends to do, however spurious the results 
(when narratives become no more than numbers, numbers become no more than stories.) 
Trump, cannibalising the technocratic preference for numbers over substantive argument, 
accounts for himself through numbers about his wealth, crowd sizes, even the vote that left 
him awkwardly reliant on the distinction between institutional democracy and 
majoritarianism.  
 
To Docherty’s examples distinguishing accountability from responsibility, we might 
add another. Questioned about Russia, Trump remarked, ‘There are a lot of killers. You think 
our country’s so innocent?’6  This was ‘authentic’ with Trump as a radical plain-speaker; yet 
his speech blatantly denies any responsibility. Though he admits to government 
wrongdoing, there is no responsibility here that someone injured by any government could 
call upon for redress – complicit in the harm it accounts for, his comment’s purpose is to 
foreclose that very possibility.  
 
Yet Trumpist authenticity, and the accounts of the world it establishes, has its 
pleasures. As Snyder observes, repetition is a dominant feature of Trump’s rhetoric, of his 
joyous, raucous call-and-response to his rally crowds. One metaphor for the hypnotic power 
of rhetorical repetition at the rally (a tactic key to Hitler’s technique, Snyder notes) is the 
hall of mirrors, where we seemingly master an infinite space with our own reflection, whilst 
remaining rooted to the spot. Yet we have no confidence to move; to go outside is to 
abandon our mastery, until some transformation eliminates the difference between the hall 
and the world. For now, the rally’s euphoria seems not to last outside it (even for Trump); 
its pleasures lack the confidence that both Snyder and Docherty locate in material contact, 
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the rule of law, and the social bond. This bond entails a ‘freedom of movement’, without 
accounting to the authorities, that authoritarians consistently attack. This involves, Snyder 
argues, an openness to material challenge to our rhetoric tactics, a 'democratic' exposure to 
different voices:  
 
In the 2016 presidential election, the two-dimensional world of the 
internet was more important than the three-dimensional world of human 
contact. People going door-to-door to canvass encountered the surprised 
blinking of American citizens who realised they would have to talk about politics 
with a flesh-and-blood human being rather than having their views affirmed by 
Facebook feeds. (Snyder, p. 74)  
 
A conversation with a three-dimensional person can disrupt a two-dimensional 
realm formed by endless repetition of affirming images. Unfortunately, Snyder’s attitude to 
visual media sometimes takes a reactionary tone; his dismissal of internet, television and 
cinema in one stroke (pp. 61-64) is far too simple. Nevertheless, he persuasively shows how 
the confidence and responsibility involved in moving within the world allow us to hear from 
others and speak for ourselves. Docherty echoes this:   
 
We resist by speaking out, but speaking out to our enemies as much as to 
our friends; and this…argument and persuasion… has to be done face-to-face, 
with all the ethical demand this entails. (Docherty, p. 24) 
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Paradoxically, speaking for oneself requires, Docherty argues, not claiming a 
position of total authenticity, but distinguishing between one’s account of the world and 
our responsibilities to the others we meet ‘face to face’. This is a gap that demands 
responsibility.  
 
Snyder complementarily locates responsible speaking in the very formality of 
institutional rules, which preclude blindly prioritising abstract accounts over material 
realities: The formality in processes of professional judgement in fields from law, to 
medicine, to academia protects time and space for thought, on the presumption that 
reality is not easily assimilated to ‘authentic’ insight or values. Engagement with 
material reality is stronger within these rules, which acknowledge their distance from it, 
than within the authenticities that claim reality for themselves. 
 
Professionals can nevertheless, Snyder observes, become complicit in totalitarian 
political transformations if they are ‘deprived of vitality and function, turned into a 
simulacrum of what they once were’ (p. 24) – just as, for Docherty, ‘accountability’ is a 
simulacrum of responsibility. Yet responsibility gives the pleasure of confidence to move 
within the world and talk with others on open terms - a pleasure brave individuals have 
sustained even under extreme threat (Snyder, pp. 57-58). 
 
Still, both Snyder and Docherty locate powerful forces that encourage complicity in 
destructive transformation of the institutions that protect this confidence. This raises 
questions: How deeply does the drive towards an apparently sudden political 
transformation lie within normal conditions? Is Trump a dramatic departure from 
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contemporary politics, or their necessary conclusion? Docherty finds that ‘norms of 
neoliberal capital… have subsumed everything’ with the ‘idea that everything is a business’ 
(p. 21) and now ‘the name of the phenomenon […] is “Donald J. Trump”’ (p. 25). Snyder 
adopts a less all-pervasive stance, but takes a long view of totalitarianisms as reaction to 
economic globalisations. 
 
One risk in Docherty’s position is that if both capitalist modernity and contemporary 
neoliberalism are inherently and ultimately prone towards totalitarianism, this could 
suggest that anything to bring about an alternative is welcome. This is not, in fact, 
Docherty’s argument, but the salutary figure here is Žižek, who justified his support for 
Trump on these terms:  
 
The inertia of status quo should somehow be broken and open space for a new 
political reconfiguration. I think this [election] is the only chance for the left.7 
 
For Žižek, the neoliberal status quo is so bleakly unitary that any alternative, if 
sufficiently disruptive, is worthwhile; we must take ‘the only chance’ for a ‘reconfiguration’: 
Here intention matters, not effect; and immediacy, not critical thought, is required - such 
thought becoming effectively reserved for Žižek himself, and time to think being dismissed 
(in an echo of Trump’s own rhetoric) as ‘inertia’. Žižek is one to whom Docherty’s charge of 
having no ‘skin in the game’ would apply, in his wholly abstract yet catastrophist position. 
(When challenged, Žižek mocked those who compare Trumpism to Fascism: The smugness 
of Reducto Ad Hitlerum strikes again).8 
 
14 
 
Docherty, though, is a no less trenchant critic of the status quo, and one of 
considerably greater responsibility. He finds contemporary neoliberalism itself corrosive of 
responsibility; even entrepreneurialism, superficially taken for self-transformation, is, 
Docherty argues, typically formulated as fulfilling some inherent identity. Trump is 
authentically an entrepreneur in these terms, and here Businessman Trump (like Politician 
Trump) reads as cannibalising tendencies within the system itself:  
 
Capital works essentially by speed… by the immediacy of a transaction, by 
the tendency to reduce and even to eliminate the time taken to complete the 
process of exchange… In a capital transaction, equivalence is established; and that 
then closes the story or deal. (Docherty, p. 117)  
 
The result, Docherty argues, is an all-encompassing and self-contained, ‘account’, a 
closed story transparently establishing equivalence of value. This can go very wrong, 
Docherty notes, as in the 2008 crisis: When the system prioritises its own coherence over 
anything else, this creates a severe risk of any complicating factor in the real world being 
erased or ignored. Trump pushes this into parody, promulgating the belief that his mere 
presence secures ‘good deals’, as though this identification was transparent in his name, 
more aesthetic than linguistic, and totally authentic in its huge letters: TRUMP. The cost of 
authenticity is to become parody, but it is one significant numbers of people are willing to 
pay.  
 
Docherty argues that establishing a better economics requires an exercise of 
judgement, currently frustrated by a linguistic and ideological system protecting the 
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powerful from responsibility. For me, a cautionary note comes here from Trump’s own 
reduction of economics to acts of will, ‘deals’ thwarted only by the manipulations of the 
‘biased’. Docherty is right to argue that mainstream politics has relied on a comprehensive 
(in practice, oversimplified and self-enclosed) rationalism, which marginalises counter-
argument and awkward reality, and has broadly influenced organisational cultures. 
However, things are not necessarily as unified as he sometimes implies; neoliberalism’s hold 
increasingly conflicts with renewed ethno-nationalism (breaking the coalition between them 
that Thatcherism, for example, represented). There are parallels between these forces 
(some of which Docherty adeptly highlights), but these parallels’ appearance as irony 
complicates their amounting to coherent underlying conditions tending in a common 
direction: The authenticities offered by Trump and neoliberal capitalism are philosophically 
connected, yet have material differences, and are not offered to the same people on the 
same terms.  
 
However, Docherty is not in fact advocating for the enacting of a unitary (or 
'authentic') economic and political vision, but rather for the permanent role of criticism - 
understood, simultaneously in both literary and political senses, as the process of 
judgement requiring responsibility. As with Snyder’s advocacy for professional judgement, 
this demands expanded democratic institutions, broadly defined. Such institutions can 
sustain time and space for the negotiated judgements essential to a functioning democracy, 
initially simply by protecting time for consideration and conversation. If that sounds open-
ended, it is not to disregard specific political consequences, but rather to take them 
seriously by refusing their reduction to judgment by intentions measured on a scale of 
authenticity.  
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Snyder and Docherty agree that such conversation is best undertaken face-to-face 
(‘practicing corporeal politics’, Snyder, p. 83), attending to the specifics of a situation rather 
than subsuming it within a predetermined account. Effective campaigning, Snyder points 
out pragmatically (p. 84), requires coalitions of the willing and responsible, not ‘authentic’ 
subscription to a unitary worldview controlled by rhetoric and its repetition. Snyder advises 
such coalitions to enter opposition territory, to have conversations about voting effects, and 
not just as a mechanism to measure voting intentions.  
 
It’s unlikely that political tacticians will take advice from scholars and theorists to 
favour simplified rhetoric and targeted campaigning less, and making the case in opposition 
territory more. Yet although such tacticians can bring persuasive justifications for simplicity, 
repetition, targeting, and manipulation of existing prejudices, these techniques have visibly 
diminishing returns: If they get their calculations only slightly wrong, they can not only lose 
elections, but damage democratic institutions. Their claim to realism should then be 
qualified.   
 
This change requires a ‘confidence’, as Docherty says - not only the confidence of 
individuals seeking conversations outside their comfort zones, but institutional confidence 
in professional responsibility rather than abstract accounting. Docherty and Snyder show 
that functioning institutions of democratic governance and participation (parliaments, 
courts, civil service, press, even universities), depend not on taking back control, but on 
giving it away in the form of protected time and space. Trump, and other authoritarian 
populists, assume that institutions exist to deliver national greatness, and so are essentially 
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facades for a natural, determined order. In fact, better institutions are defined by a set of 
rules rather than by authentic identity. They require responsibility in judgement of effects, 
rather than accountability to authentic intentions.  
 
Our current politics often fear this responsibility. Yet Snyder and Docherty show that 
responsibility can involve joy – the joy of not identifying everything (and so inevitably 
reaching a narrower view of the real world), but of being responsible for something. It is no 
coincidence that, as Snyder details, some of the most heroic exercises of responsibility arose 
from refusal to abandon personal commitments when the times required it: Protecting 
intimate life from being sacrificed to politics can, paradoxically, sustain politics itself; after 
all, what ‘Arendt meant by totalitarianism was not an all-powerful state, but the erasure of 
the difference between private and public life’ (Snyder, p. 88).  
 
Docherty notices that having ‘skin in the game’ simultaneously implies both political 
exposure and human intimacy. To act publically depends on protecting privacy, as the 
potential creation of effects without forewarning by intentions rendered transparent to the 
authorities. This privacy aligns with the confidence of ‘free movement’, with its implied 
resistance to authenticity and transparency (tellingly, the UK’s recent turn against free 
movement within the European Union was adopted as policy by a Prime Minister who seeks 
to seriously undermine the legal protections of private life). To me, both authors miss an 
opportunity to consider the psychoanalytic implications of the relationship they find 
between privacy and political responsibility; Docherty's theoretical attentions are 
elsewhere, but Snyder's under-theorisation of the issues he invokes here feels frustratingly 
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like a result of the occasionally too-slim format that the book has adopted to quickly reach a 
broad audience.  
 
If responsibility is joyful, it’s also necessary. Totalitarian regimes, historically, do not 
indefinitely sustain protection to those most complicit in them. Yet it is easy, Snyder notes, 
to co-operate in advance with political transformation; it is much harder to be responsible in 
advance. To counter this difficulty, we need both personal and institutional commitment. 
There is also, reading across the two books, an implicit challenge for the Left here. This is 
the challenge of expanding institutional representation without conditions of allegiance to a 
defined vision of reality. As Docherty indicates, criticism is a permanent need, not a means 
to realisation of a single end. This is in no way to preclude the importance of political and 
economic justice; rather to suggest that achieving them is hindered by tests of authentic 
intention.  
 
 Translating between comparative cultural and political history, professional ethics, 
and political judgement, these two works are prototypes of the responsibility they demand. 
There are many parts of their project that others need to fill in: the probing of the 
relationship between perception and reality that runs under both works, and their concern 
with how both tyranny and resistance can engage our most intimate wishes, cry out for 
psychoanalytic perspectives to be included. More fundamentally, the work of historical 
comparison is necessarily incomplete, because the political transformations of 2016 and 
2017 are not – whatever else they may be – closed stories.  
Dominic Dean 
University of Sussex 
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